[1]胡宁,陈健.不完全契约委托代理模型及分包价格方程分析[J].山东建筑大学学报,2017,(04):317-321.
 Hu Ning,Chen Jian.Construction of incomplete contract principal agent model and  analysis of subcontract price equation[J].,2017,(04):317-321.
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不完全契约委托代理模型及分包价格方程分析()
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《山东建筑大学学报》[ISSN:1673-7644/CN:37-1449/TU]

卷:
期数:
2017年04期
页码:
317-321
栏目:
研究论文
出版日期:
2017-08-15

文章信息/Info

Title:
Construction of incomplete contract principal agent model and  analysis of subcontract price equation
文章编号:
1673-7644(2017)04-0317-05
作者:
胡宁陈健
(山东建筑大学 商学院,山东济南250101)
Author(s):
Hu Ning Chen Jian
(School of Business, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan 250101, China)
关键词:
不完全契约委托代理理论分包价格方程
Keywords:
incomplete contract principalagent theory subcontract price equation
分类号:
F062.5
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
不完全契约总包商、分包商委托代理关系研究对建筑工程合同的制定和履行有重要的现实意义。文章基于不完全契约下委托代理理论在建筑合同领域的应用,围绕总包商和分包商自身利益对分包价格的追求,构建了总包商分包商委托代理模型,获得了均衡时最优的分包价格决定方程,并对分包效率的影响因素如何制约最优分包价格进行了分析。结果表明:通过对总包商、分包商视角下的委托代理模型分析,可分别获得其分包价格期望值方程;当总包商的分包价格期望值小于分包商的分包价格期望值时,实际发生的分包价格为总包商的分包价格期望值,会造成分包商偷工减料;当总包商的分包价格期望值大于、等于分包商的分包价格期望值时,实际发生的分包价格为分包商的分包价格期望值,可有效激励分包商的均衡分包价格。
Abstract:
Research on the principalagency relationship of the contractor and the subcontractor under incomplete contract has an important practical significance for the drawing and performance of the construction contract. Based on the incomplete contract theory and principalagent theory application in the field of construction contracts, around the contractors selfinterest pursuit of the optimal subcontract price and the subcontractors selfinterest pursuit of the optimal subcontract price, we established a contractor subcontractor principalagent model, based on their pursuit of selfinterest maximization, solved the optimal equilibrium subcontract price decision equation, and we did an analysis of the factors influencing the efficiency of the optimal subcontractor price. The result shows that: By analyzing the principalagent model from the perspective of the subcontractor and the perspective of the subcontractor, their expected value equation of the subcontracting price can be respectively obtained; By solving the principalagent model from the perspective of subcontractor, the expected value equation of subcontractors subcontract price can be obtained. When the contractors subcontract price expectation is less than subcontractors subcontract price expectation, subcontract price will be the actual contractors subcontract price expectation, the subcontractor may cut corners. When the contractors subcontract price expectation is equal or greater than subcontractors subcontract price expectation, subcontract price will be the actual subcontractors subcontract price expectation, which is also an balance price which can effectively motivate the subcontractor.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2017-06-11
基金项目:山东建筑大学横向课题项目(2015H0069)
作者简介:胡宁(1964-),男,教授,硕士,主要从事房地产经济管理等方面的研究.E-mail:dzz@sdjzu.edu.cnxyni
更新日期/Last Update: 2017-07-05